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Conceiving of
Products and
the Products
of Conception:
Reflections on
Commodification,
Consumption,
ART, and
Abortion
Jody Lyneé Madeira

“A good wit will make use of any thing: I will
turn diseases to commodity.”
Sir John Falstaff,
King Henry IV, Part II, Act I, Scene II

Introduction
Thorny and difficult questions permeate the issue of
commodification of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and abortion. Are ART and abortion services or medical treatment? Are those who seek them
patients or consumers? How should we understand
the complex relationship between money, markets,
choice, and the care relationship?
This paper rejects the dichotomy between patient
and consumer roles and focuses instead on how attributes of each are meaningful to those seeking health
care. Arguing that health care is already commodified, it suggests that both medicine and the market
offer strategies for handling commodification. The
important questions are how we understand these
attributes and their role in care relationships, and
which attributes we should encourage. The medical
profession and patient role have long accommodated
commodification, using fiduciary roles, flat fees and
opaque pricing to distance payment and pricing from
care provision. In contrast, the market and consumer
role emphasize choice and consumer agency, armslength transactions, and exchange for value. To avoid
the dehumanization of the commodification critique,
health care can be restructured to combine elements
of both patient and consumer choice models.
The first step is to untangle two discourses usually
positioned as contradictory and competing: patient vs.
consumer and commodification vs. non-commodification. Social science research shows that “patient” and
“consumer” are not useful to most care-seekers, the
vast majority of whom define themselves as patients.
Rather, these terms are umbrella concepts that stand
for several attributes — agency, responsibility, communication, compassion, and so on. By identifying as
a “patient” or a “consumer,” care-seekers signal what
attributes are important, and in what degree (e.g., how
they prefer providers to display empathy, and how
important that attribute is compared to others). The
ideal care relationship merges the attributes of both
the patient and consumer roles that they subjectively
judge “best” — high communication, high empathy,
high choice, medium agency — rendering the distinction between the patient/consumer roles unimportant.
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Commodification also impacts reform. Scholars
usually focus on the market/altruism dichotomy, on
whether or not a price is charged, and perhaps on the
doctor-patient relationship. But commodification’s
positive and negative aspects come not from the doctor-patient relation or payment of fees but from the
physician’s orientation to her role and to other doctors — how doctors judge success, and what medical
enterprises are organized to achieve. Interestingly, the
“best” physicians and clinics are not non-commodified, but redefine commodified care. They do not try
to escape the market or work against it, but use it to
streamline services without sacrificing care.

unequal because patients lack equal power, status, and
knowledge and therefore depend upon doctors, who
attempt to heal but may inadvertently harm. This relationship may include compassion and trust, “openness
and respect,” but also authoritarianism and paternalism.5 The law acknowledges patients’ vulnerability by
creating a protective rights scheme, creating a fiduciary
doctor-patient relationship in contrast to the “caveat
emptor” consumer standard.6
In contrast, both in health care and in commerce
more broadly, consumer implies a transaction in
which service is exchanged for payment. A consumer
experiences services or ingests products.7 The term

This paper rejects the dichotomy between patient and consumer roles and
focuses instead on how attributes of each are meaningful to those seeking
health care. Arguing that health care is already commodified, it suggests that
both medicine and the market offer strategies for handling commodification.
The important questions are how we understand these attributes and their
role in care relationships, and which attributes we should encourage.
In Part I, this essay defines the roles of patient and
consumer, and then describes how they are ultimately
less important than the attributes of which they are
comprised. In Part II, it describes theories of commodification and consumption in reproductive contexts and their negative and positive consequences,
from compliance and coercion to resistance and creativity. It also examines whether ART and abortion
are “markets,” when, and with what effects. In Part III,
this essay explores how the attributes which comprise
the patient/consumer roles can be incorporated into
health care reform, and the implications that various
health care reform models would have for ART and
abortion.

Beyond the Patient/Consumer Dichotomy
Redefining Patients and Consumers
Derived from the Latin “patiens” (“to suffer” or “to
bear”), a patient is often characterized in social science
and popular culture as sick, vulnerable, having few if any
choices, and passive.1 On one hand, the term may trigger
stigma, abnormality, or even neuroticism; on the other,
it can initiate therapeutic relationships.2 “Patient” may
not accurately describe “healthy” individuals who seek
preventative care, advice, or elective services, and it can
imply patient passivity and provider omniscience.3 A
patient is in a “thick” relationship with an alter ego — a
care-provider or physician.4 This relation is inherently
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“consumer” can empower, infuse normality into stigmatized and subordinated experiences and identities, decrease paternalism and demedicalize care roles
and relationships.8 It might better fit healthy persons
seeking preventative care or advice.9 Moreover, “consumer” connotes rationality, vocality, and choice over
products and uses.
Ideally, a health care consumer weighs medical costs
against perceived benefits and obtains care from the
“best value” provider.10 As market creatures, consumers
are active in health care decision-making, armed with
information, confidence, assertiveness, and the rights
to demand treatment access, options, providers, and
desires.11 Unlike patients, consumers need not be in
relationships with physicians at all; if they are, the relationship is arms-length, like “businessman-customer,”
and connotes financial remuneration, commerce and
industry, and the “generic contractual aspects of a
standardized professional service.”12 Premised on an
economic-legalistic rather than moral-ethical framework, this relation emphasizes “efficiency, profit maximization, consumer satisfaction, ability to pay, planning, entrepreneurship, and competitive models.”13 The
commercialization of “consumer” inspires discomfort
or even visceral dislike in most care professionals, for
whom it trivializes the care relationship and renders
professionals entrepreneurs.14
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Mining these role descriptions reveals stark disparities. Patients are supposedly unwell, in need, vulnerable, passive, devoid of agency and choice, stigmatized,
lack control, and in an inherently unequal treatment
relationship. In relationships with care professionals,
patients seek compassion, trust, openness, respect,
information, competence, and guidance; paternalism
may even be expected or welcomed. Health care consumers, on the other hand, are allegedly competent,
rational, independent, active, assertive, informed,
free to choose services and providers (or walk away).
They have purchasing power, and are not necessarily
in a treatment relationship (again, this portrait contrasts with the vulnerable consumer within consumer
protection). In treatment relations, consumers seek
value and competence. From this perspective, the
patient and consumer roles appear locked in a contest between “haves” and “have-nots.” Both roles seem
too extreme to encapsulate care-seekers’ lived experiences, but strand most in the messy middle.
But if we look past labels to what “makes” a patient
or consumer, we can see that they are comprised of several attributes which individuals may feel are more or
less important for them to adopt in their relationships
with care providers: self-capacity, control, agency,
advocacy, and choice or opportunity. Similarly, most
care seekers will prioritize certain qualities in “good”
care provider relationships: trust, openness, compassion or sensitivity, respect, communication (including information and dialogue), continuity, commitment, competence, and affordability. These attributes
become important because we cannot “inspect” service quality before treatment and must negotiate
uncertainty through a “generalized belief in the ability of the physician.”15 Of course, certain attributes are
more important given individual preferences, needs,
or treatment contexts. For example, building trust
in ART, where women usually make several visits to
one provider, will be different than in abortion, where
most make one or two visits.
Focusing on the attributes that comprise the patient
and consumer roles overcomes the many limitations of
regarding these roles as a dichotomy. It avoids semantic puzzles and reflects that “the roles of doctor/provider and patient/consumer are hard to disentangle.”16
It explains our discomfort over “consumer” and our
urge to preserve what seems valuable about “patient.”
It rescues us from comparisons between those “ill and
seeking help” and those “purchasing a pair of socks
or a pound of sausages.”17 These attributes become
unique goods inherent in medical ideology and care
relations, comprising the “care” in the care relation.
They help determine care-seekers’ provider satisfaction, make care experiences feel less or non-commodabortion and art • summer 2015

ified, and are tools for demanding “better” care. Careseekers think in terms of these attributes, not in terms
of patient and consumer roles. Ideally, these attributes
themselves become goods that care-seekers and providers exchange within relationships, and for which
many may willingly pay higher costs. Moreover, this
approach means that care seekers and providers are
not restricted to one “role” within the relationship, but
have the freedom to prioritize certain attributes over
time and in response to developments in the treatment relationship.
By themselves, “patient” and “consumer” labels
give little information about care-seeker behaviors, or
whether they are helpful or problematic. But focusing on role attributes gives us an exponentially more
detailed experiential view, allowing us to assess and
remedy specific harms rather than judging care-seekers to be failing as patients or consumers. We can most
effectively improve care experiences by prioritizing
different attributes.
The patient/consumer debate has, however, provided guidance on which attributes are most important. Most social science scholars and commentators
prefer “patient” because of care-seekers’ vulnerability,
relational dependence, patient rights and the term’s
emphasis on beneficence (versus autonomy), the doctor-patient relation, and its emphasis on partnership
over mere choice.18 Unsurprisingly, most care-seekers
surveyed (and often the vast majority) see themselves
as “patients”19 — a proxy for expressing comfort with
a certain attribute bundle over others. Focusing on
the attributes comprising patient and consumer roles
frees us from purchasing a role “package” or engaging in debates over role superiority. Moreover, these
attributes play key roles in how care-seekers negotiate
reproductive commodification within ART and abortion, refocusing on the humanity of a treatment experience situated within the market.

From Reproductive Commodification to
Reproductive Creativity and Beyond
Debates over patient and consumer roles become
more complex when mapped onto questions of how
markets and commodification affect ART and abortion. This essay argues that reproductive health care
is inherently commodified. Therefore, it focuses primarily on how we negotiate and experience commodified reproductive care. Focusing on which attributes
care seekers prioritize is critical. Care seekers earmark
these attributes as significant based on their experiences within a commodified treatment environment,
and can guide reforms. If it is good for business to
focus on these attributes in all care environments,
these attributes will become available to care-seekers
295
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of all socioeconomic statuses. Hence, commodification
can benefit, not just burden, those least well off. Thus,
just as we rejected the patient/consumer dichotomy,
we must push beyond the commodification/non-commodification dichotomy to focus on how these attributes are present in consumer experience and affect
providers’ orientation to care seekers, colleagues and
practice areas.
Reproductive Commodification,
Consumptive Creativity
Commodification refers to “the economic and cultural
processes” through which objects become marked as
commodities, and their consequences.20 Goods or services become commodities — things to be exchanged
for value — by acquiring exchange and use values in
a marketplace.21 Commodities are external to people, and may seem like alien objects in commercial
space, “cold and sterile” entities that functionally
serve human needs and can be manipulated.22 But
our relationships with commodities may change; once
acquired, commodities can be appropriated and personalized. Commodification and commodities acquire
value through consumption, “the purchase and use of
goods, services, materials, or energy.”23
Problems arise when comparing objects that can be
valued in different ways, such as shoes and sex; while
some argue that both can have monetary value, others
would object to putting a price on sex. “Both pro- and
anti-commodification camps” tend to “frame discussions in terms of an on-off decision about whether
or not to commodify,” so that the “discussion [] follows fixed rails, forever trying to pinpoint the proper
boundary between market and nonmarket transactions.”24 Others have argued that there are degrees of
commodification, from universal, to incomplete or
partial to no commodification.25
Opposition to reproductive commodification produces strange bedfellows. Both conservatives and
liberals co-opt commodification discourse supporting certain “protective” restrictions or improved conditions in abortion and ART. Barred from shutting
down abortion markets entirely (under the “undue
burden” standard in Planned Parenthood v. Casey),
conservatives want to impose market constraints presented as choice architecture.26 Basing regulations
on “women-protective anti-abortion” reasoning, they
support waiting periods, informed consent modifications, extended counseling, ultrasounds, clinic compliance with hospital building guidelines, restricted
public funding and mandatory provider admitting
privileges.27 After the Missouri legislature extended a
24-hour abortion waiting period to 72 hours on May
13, 2014, “Missouri Right to Life” released a state296

ment asserting “[this bill] will save babies and protect
all women…from abortion clinics seeking to make a
profit on an abortion.”28 Liberals also adopt consumer
rhetoric, but to preserve choice, stressing women’s
“right to choose,” access to “safe” abortion, or “abortion
on demand.” One advocacy guide advises “consumer
demand is a powerful tool for change” and asserts that
“women — the consumers or primary beneficiaries
of safe abortion — can have a strong effect on many
aspects of health care by demanding change.”29
Reactions to commodification and consumption
have changed over time. Theorists have long disagreed
over how commodification affects human potentials
for creativity and identity-formation. Early economic
approaches such as Marxism posited that workers
became alienated from their labor when consuming goods, transforming social relations into relations between things.30 For Frederic Jameson and the
Frankfurt School, such market relations manipulated
consumers into satisfying producers’ needs and generating profits.31 Similarly, reproduction has been analogized to industrial factory production, with pregnancy as factory floor, the uterus as baby-producing
machine, the pregnant woman as laborer, the doctor
as foreman dedicated to a production schedule and
fetuses as commodities.32
The Chicago School and law and economics movements embraced universal commodification – a market for everything.33 Most since then oppose universal
commodification,34 targeting the parent/surrogatechildren and donor/patient-physician relationships.
Addressing egg donation, surrogacy, prenatal testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD),
scholars argue that women’s bodies and reproductive
capacities, embryos, fetuses, and children should not
be commodified, and warn that ART can coerce and
exploit patients. They argue that it is impossible or
unwise to monetarily value certain goods, that monetary valuation does not capture these goods’ significance, that valuation and exchange can warp those
goods, and that transactions exchanging these goods
for money are involuntary or accessed unequally. 35
Many of these arguments presume that intimate relations and economic transactions belong to “hostile
worlds” or “separate spheres.”36 Conflating these categories violates human dignity and moral worth; thus,
Margaret Jane Radin has famously urged, some goods
should be “market-inalienable.”37 Similarly, Edmund
Pellegrino argues health care is not a commodity since
it “center[s] too much on universal human needs” and
its effectiveness depends on interpersonal relations,
not objects.38 A commodified doctor-patient encounter may become “a commercial relationship” governed
by commerce, torts, and contracts instead of profesjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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sional ethics, fostering “profit-making and pursuit of
self-interest.”39
But other scholars focus on how people create personal and social identity within commodified environments. Scholars have become more skeptical of
anti-commodification arguments, observing that
harm lies in how objects are used, and that such arguments create caricatures of coerced victims and commercial contractors.40 Kimberly Krawiec asserts that
anti-commodification arguments are elitist, “invoked
for political gains” by groups whose interests are “at
odds with broader social goals,” and observes that the
problems they target often are unrelated to commodification.41 Vivianna Zelizer posits that “markets do
not overrun cultures but are themselves defined and

markets “cannot persuasively rest on concerns over
commodification and commercialization, as the market was commodified and commercialized long ago.”47
The question then becomes how persons negotiate
commodified reproductive contexts and with what
consequences.
Consequently, our investigations into commodification and consumption must not stop at whether care
seekers use treatments creatively or to modify selfidentity, but must penetrate further into their lived
experiences of these treatments. This is essential in
ART and abortion, where care seekers’ first goal is
attaining or terminating pregnancy, accomplishing
something beyond altering self-identity. These treatment experiences are very different than, say, buying

our investigations into commodification and consumption must not stop
at whether care seekers use treatments creatively or to modify self-identity,
but must penetrate further into their lived experiences of these treatments.
This is essential in ART and abortion, where care seekers’ first goal is
attaining or terminating pregnancy, accomplishing something beyond
altering self-identity. These treatment experiences are very different than,
say, buying designer jeans. Focusing on the treatment experience also
provides insight into how people consume care services to complete
self-identity projects (i.e., attaining or avoiding motherhood).
influenced by culture,” and that market transactions
and intimate relations are inherently interdependent.42 Martha Ertman explains how commodification can overcome barriers violating human dignity
(e.g., extending reproductive options for gays and
lesbians).43 Ruth Fletcher’s theory of reproductive
consumption focuses on how we “negotiate reproduction as a necessary human activity” that contributes
to creativity and relationship-building and not merely
profiteering.44 ART and abortion, then, are contexts
where care seekers negotiate “how best to understand
and adjudicate the relationship between ‘persons’ and
‘things.’”45
This essay, too, is skeptical of anti-commodification
arguments, and argues that they are passé because
reproduction is already inherently and almost certainly intractably commodified. The very language
that is the rallying cry for reproductive decision-making – choice – is more closely identified with the stereotypical consumer role. Reproductive decisions such
as whether to freeze eggs or undergo IVF or adoption
are at base decisions about consumption and distribution.46 Thus, for Krawiec, objections to reproductive
abortion and art • summer 2015

designer jeans. Focusing on the treatment experience
also provides insight into how people consume care
services to complete self-identity projects (i.e., attaining or avoiding motherhood).48 It is important to note
that a treatment experience can only de-commoditize,
not non-commoditize, reproductive technologies or
services. Just because a care seeker does not feel like
she has had a commodified treatment experience does
not mean that the treatment ceases to be commodified. De-commodification does not end commodification; when goods or services are marked as “other
than commodities,” other meanings attach despite
commodification and become important because they
contradict it.49
B. ART and Abortion as Sites of Consumerism
and Commodification
Assessing ART and abortion as commodified services
implicates reproductive choice. Sometimes, choice
is illusory; we make decisions in response to felt
needs, lack of viable options, or cultural imperatives.
Undergoing IVF, for instance, reaffirms cultural ideals of persistence and effort.50 Choice also connotes
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cultural decision-making norms favoring rationality
and reflection as well as the specter of mistake, and
therefore invites consumer-protection measures. The
“distinctive and crucial feature” of consumerism, after
all, is “purchasers choosing well.”51 Care-seekers who
exercise (consumer) “choice” (especially when footing
large bills) face a social imperative to be a “good consumer…which implies a moral judgment” that can be
fulfilled through behaviors such as interviewing service providers.52 Moreover, constitutional protections
for “negative” reproductive rights compel governmental inaction, divorcing choice from access and reinforcing market privatization. Our reactions to commodifying ART and abortion may differ, according to
whether we feel these contexts are in fact elective, and
our perceptions of treatment relationships and providers’ orientation to colleagues and practice areas.
In both ART and abortion, medical culture can subordinate the payment transaction as do other health
care contexts, rendering consumption inconspicuous.
ART is constructed as more extravagant and private,
more “elective” (and “elite”). The stereotypical ART
patient, after all, is the well-off older career woman
who delayed childbearing.53 Most care-seekers expect
to pay high prices (which may perversely increase
ART’s mystique), expect good doctors to be well-paid,
and anticipate that clinics will be not merely comfortable, clean, and sanitary but lavish and fashionable.
We likely are more comfortable with ART’s commodification so long as it improves care quality, incentivizing goods like quality provider relations and not
factory-like treatment experiences.
In contrast to ART, abortion implicates public concerns and public health, lies at the heart of privacy
and human rights, and is in wider demand. Because
abortion is more stigmatized and yet is a reproductive
right, commercial advertising of abortion services,
for-profit abortion clinics, high procedure prices,
and high provider salaries seem distasteful and more
exploitative. Abortion stigma can make abortion seem
“dirty,” and many care-seekers are surprised to find
abortion clinics clean and sanitary, let alone comfortable.54 Abortion may then seem more “non-elective”
(“non-elite” or secretive), and mainstream culture is
less comfortable with abortion commodification, as
illustrated by stereotypes of greedy abortion providers
and abortion mills as well as advocates’ appeals to safe
abortions and decreased stigma.
art as a market
ART is a market, and market forces shape demand.55
“Vibrant” fertility clinic websites, buoyant with babies
and links to clinic information, treatments, financing,
and educational resources allow clinics to reach poten298

tial patients.56 Paying for ART is also commodified;
clinics can offer multi-cycle discounts or refund programs such as “shared risk,” provide in-house financing, or funnel care-seekers to third-party financing
firms.57 Here, too, clinics must keep up with market
demands; one clinic felt it needed to extend credit to
compete with others, and these arrangements may
enhance consumer access and loyalty.58
But not all is sunshine and roses; market forces provoke additional criticisms. Patients may be susceptible
to doctors’ recommendations, lending terms may be
unclear, and doctors may have conflicts of interest if
various lenders charge them differently for patient
loans.59 Moreover, ART patients – typically “middleaged, highly educated, rich, and white” who “usually
look like very sophisticated consumers” – may in fact
be vulnerable and likely to suffer from depression and
desperation, creating “almost inelastic demand.”60 In
addition, ART care-seekers may be “unable to assess
the costs of fertility care versus the value of a child.”61
Finally, it is hard not to wonder about commodification’s effect upon doctor-patient relations after reading
a statement such as this one from the “2nd IVF Worldwide Live Congress: A Marketing Wrap-Up” which
equates “patients” to “sales”: “Take a 10% conversion
rate; meaning – out of every 10 legitimate inquires you
receive, you “close” one sale, you deliver treatments to
1 patient….you know you are converting at least 1 out
of 10 leads into a real sale, a real patient.”62
Scholars worry about decision-making oversight
and responsibility. ART and in vitro fertilization
(IVF) may function as consumer goods when treatment decisions escape medical oversight, particularly
for the uninsured; when care-seekers feel that private
payment enables them to choose treatment and control protocols; and when market regulation controls
access and raises prices.63 Criticism within ART warns
that cost-conscious patients risk multiple pregnancies, inter-clinic competition and lack of state regulation discourage single-embryo transfers, and clinics
deny or downplay market participation.64 Moreover,
the industry places parenthood on a pedestal.65
Sociologist Gay Becker pushes beyond commodification to explore how ART care-seekers as consumers
negotiate commodification and consumption. ART
carries cultural meanings, including identity creation
and “hope of motherhood,” and reinforces “strong
cultural priorities” such as optimism, autonomy and
choice and medical miracles.66 Becker describes a
technological race to the top, where providers pursue novel treatments to satisfy care-seekers’ marketdriven expectations.67 Here, overt commodification is
excused; neither ART’s expense nor physician profits
may seem inappropriate to care-seekers, given ART’s
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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“magic” and cultural norms of earning high pay for
gestational surrogate Crystal Kelley secretly gave birth
hard work.68
out-of-state after the intended parents offered her
Crucially, however, ART care-seekers are often
$10,000 to abort a fetus with birth defects (allegedly,
savvy to the commodification processes. They “often
the surrogate initially proposed a $15,000 counterwonder if the…doctors’ motives are primarily medioffer but rescinded it before fleeing).78 This example
cal or lucrative,” whether providers who aggressively
illustrates the various stereotypes of how commodirecommend IVF are profiteers, and whether ART is
fication purportedly affects ART and abortion. Many
“a business which operate[s] on their hopes.”69 They
aspects of ART seem open to market negotiation, but
are “disgusted” by greedy doctors, insulted
by “aggressive sales methods,” and deplore
“consumerist” indicia like packed waiting
Despite our discomfort, we cannot ignore the
rooms, visible counters of patient pregways in which abortion services function as a
nancies, and providers who do not listen
to patients or give individualized treatmarket, and how constraints and expansions in
ment plans.70 In treatment relationships,
abortion access have both had market effects.
care-seekers can “exercise control of prices
The abortion market is affected by and in
and of obtaining quality products,” and
resist the way that ART as a commoditension with other markets. Women routinely
fied service is offered through skepticism
enter markets to access private abortion
and complaints, even as they continue to
services. Restricting abortion access can have
undergo treatment and maintain hope.71
Thus, Becker concludes, care-seekers are
drastic market effects, but state and market
a driving consumer force, especially when
improvements in access and public payment
“defending their own interests, and partichelp to de-commodify abortion, reduce its
ipate thereby in the redefinition of medical treatments.”72
moral, costs and render it more routine.
abortion as a market
The commodification of abortion is much more complicated than in ART, and there are few analyses of
“abortion markets.” Perhaps this is at least partially
because abortion is still seen as a different kind of
market. Historically, abortion provision has met with
significant resistance. As recently as the 1970s, states
criminalized the act of encouraging abortion through
lectures, advertisements or other mediums. One early
First Amendment advertising case concerning abortion
referral service advertisements expressly commodifies
abortion, extending protection since no party claimed
these messages “related to a commodity or service that
was then illegal.”73 Hospital administrators have feared
that abortion could “threaten those types of [private]
donations” on which hospitals increasingly rely.74 Lack
of abortion access – a key market factor – has explained
why many women have to cross national borders to
obtain procedures, and why some countries may punish third parties who would profit accordingly.75
Abortion has long been viewed as “dirty work” and
positioned as “morally reprehensible,” particularly
given “[o]ur silence and polarized moral debates about
abortion.”76 Abortion was certainly marginalized when
Joffe researched abortion care work in the late 1970s.77
Abortion and market concepts remain dangerous bedfellows today; witness the 2013 “Baby S” case, where
abortion and art • summer 2015

abortion is usually construed as a matter of conscience
and moral belief. The idea that money could sway a
woman from her (assumedly) deep-seated convictions, and that she could respond by demanding a
higher price for this compromise seemed preposterous to many. Thus, individuals tread lightly when they
speak of abortion “markets”:
[B]uying and selling, entitlement and theft, private and public ownership, owning and disowning, seem not to circulate through the discursive
terrain of unwanted pregnancy.…This suggests
that whatever abortion currently is or means it
cannot and does not have anything to do with
economy. Further, that it hints at an underlying
value judgment: that it should not.79
Several reasons likely explain our reticence to speak of
abortion “markets.” Perhaps our unease stems from the
prominence of altruism in abortion providers’ practice
orientations. Numerous providers accept lower earnings and exponentially heightened danger to advance
social justice, and frequently speak of their work as a
“calling.” ART providers may choose their specialty for
altruistic reasons, but face no comparable earnings
reduction or danger risk. Moreover, the sharp increase
299

S Y MPO SIUM

in organized violence against abortion clinics since the
1980s may make us more hesitant to investigate (and
expose, even in academic forums) clinic business practices than in the 1970s. Finally, abortion markets seem
somehow more insidious; here, the specter of inequality is more horrifying, and there is wider consensus
that health insurance should cover these procedures.80
We sense that unequal access to abortion affects
human flourishing in a different way than within ART.
But despite our discomfort, we cannot ignore the
ways in which abortion services function as a market,
and how constraints and expansions in abortion access
have both had market effects. The abortion market is
affected by and in tension with other markets. Women
routinely enter markets to access private abortion services. Restricting abortion access can have drastic market effects, but state and market improvements in access
and public payment help to de-commodify abortion,
reduce its moral, costs and render it more routine.81
There is certainly more vocal soul-searching among
abortion providers over the allocation of funds and the
ethics of a for-profit ethos than among ART providers.
Early publications document tensions between business and social welfare models of clinic operation and
pricing, the role of providers’ private interests, and
reliance upon commercial or alternative mediums of
promotion.82
These tensions have been particularly acute for
abortion care workers, who must balance efficiency
and humanization and grapple with managerial
involvement. Writing of abortion care work today,
Todd observes that, although many employees “draw
on the caring components of our practice,” “our jobs
are becoming more rationalized and routinized with
an increased emphasis on technical aspects and less
of a focus on caring and interpersonal relations.”83 In
her memoir, Merle Hoffman, founder, president, and
CEO of Choices Women’s Medical Center, describes
herself as a proponent of “informed medical consumerism” and credits Roe v. Wade for initiating the
women’s health movement and creating “the reality
of the female medical consumer.”84 Hoffman reflects
upon abortion provision in the 1990s, recalling that
almost all clinics charged the same fees (except for
“unscrupulous physicians” who charged “illegal immigrant women…unconscionably high rates”), and that
she lowered fees for women coming from states with
more restrictive abortion laws.85 Although she found
the subject of profits was frequently uncomfortable,
commercial success gave her power:
I was the only woman owner of a licensed abortion facility in New York; yet my feminist peers
often made me feel as though I was doing some300

thing wrong. Many in the movement felt a real
activist should be struggling financially, or at
least be working for a nonprofit.…I was “making
money off the movement”….Money has given me
many types of power. With it I have been able
to run my clinic the way I want it to be run.…
Money has given me the power to support political campaigns and donate to worthy causes.86
Moreover, the anti-abortion movement has taken
advantage of abortion commodification to inflict
damage on abortion services by trying to shut down
“markets.” During Operation Rescue’s protest blockades of one feminist clinic in the late 1980s, “business
declined 25, 30 percent.”87 More recently, state regulations — supposedly protective of women — have
forced several clinics in embattled states such as Texas
and Ohio to close their doors.
Like other consumption sites, abortion can facilitate identity creation and resistance. Women might
terminate a pregnancy because they do not want or
lack the resources to engage in certain forms of consumption, do not want parental responsibilities, find
the pregnancy threatens established relationships, or
do not want this particular child. Women can create
self-identity by accessing abortion (and perhaps even
a particular method) and adapting that lived experience to their needs.
Despite heavy regulation, abortion is still a consumer-driven reproductive market. Clinics respond to
specific consumer needs. British clinics have altered
services for Irish women; American clinics near the
Canadian border set up solicitation and referral systems, advertising, and transportation when Canada
outlawed abortion; and American clinics have evolved
funding schemes for low-income women.88 Moreover,
clinics’ care ethic and women’s emotional investments
in abortion are also commodified. Clinic advertisements not only highlight compassionate care but
explicitly value privacy and convenience; many clinics
allow women to pay extra for a shorter wait time, to
have support persons with them during the procedure,
and even to close the clinic. Non-profit independent
clinics may offer women better relational care, prioritizing quality interaction between care professionals and care seekers (e.g., no counseling time limits),
but at higher prices. The problem is that reproductive
rights supporters want all women to experience these
advantages, regardless of socioeconomic status.

Commodification, Care Experience,
and Reform
Does consumerism proffer good guidelines for changing health care systems? Though current health care
journal of law, medicine & ethics

Jody Lyneé Madeira

systems are commodified, they lack the range of
choices typical of true consumer markets, and thus
health care purchasers do not enjoy the innovation
in health care options that a consumer market would
bring.
Thus, once more, we encounter “choice” — which
we hear much about but enjoy little opportunity to
exercise. The appeal of choice within consumer markets is intertwined with self-control. Effective consumer activity is coupled with autonomous personhood.89 Consumers must both “promote their desires
and pleasures” and remain in control of them.90 To
consume in excess is to lose self-control, consumer
efficacy, and therefore respect and trust.91 But as consumer protection efforts recognize, most consumers
may have little, if any, sovereign power. Thus, this section will focus on how current consumerist perspectives harm women, whether consumer-driven health
care models will bring positive changes, and how such
models would impact ART and abortion.
How Current Consumerist Perspectives
Shortchange Women
Normative understandings of consumerism leave
women undergoing ART or abortion in an untenable
position. If a baby is a “product,” then these women
have already “failed” as producers — they either cannot get pregnant and produce the goods, or they produce a pregnancy at the wrong time or without the
requisite desire or resources to sustain their child(ren).
And they fail as consumers, who are supposed to exercise self-control to gain mastery of themselves, and
their (reproductive) desires and products. Sundry
arguments have been made that couples undergoing
ART are ruled by desperation.92 Similarly, in pro-life
discourse, terminating a pregnancy itself evidences
women’s failure as responsible participants in consensual sex, perhaps behaving more as compulsive sexual
consumers seeking to evade the consequences of their
sprees.
In fulfilling their desires to conceive or terminate
pregnancy, women in both ART and abortion are
supposedly seduced into services with overtones of
excess, selfishness, profligacy, and even hedonism —
misrepresentations that eliminate socioeconomic disparities in these consumer populations. As services of
excess, ART and abortion allegedly trivialize life and
degrade personhood. Repeat abortion on demand
may be construed as an immoral form of birth control,
and continuous rounds of IVF may generate not only
multiple pregnancies, but pregnancies of multiples. If
“consumer practices considered as ‘normal’ all have in
common the fact they are viewed as both the realization of desires and their containment,”93 then popuabortion and art • summer 2015

lar narratives suggest that these women have neither
realized their desires (to become pregnant or un-pregnant) nor contained their desires (for procreation or
for sexual activity).
Finally, it is significant that these reproductive
consumers are mostly women.94 Females are stereotypically “profligate shoppers,”95 and representations
of their excess and ill-considered choice are cultural
mainstays. Moreover, mainstream society does not
celebrate autonomous reproductive decision-making
as it does other choices, leaving women feeling that
that their decisions are stigmatized and silenced. In
their reproductive consumption experiences, women
may experience a tragic “gap, and even a trade-off,
between internal meanings in terms of satisfaction
and creativity and external rewards in terms of status and recognition.”96 In other words, women are not
accorded consumer capital for making reproductive
choices, even though their consumption experience
is thereby enriched. Nor are women given credit for
learning how best to effectuate reproductive goals,
gaining personal growth, or being effective participants in relations with partners, providers, and others.
Consumer-Driven Health Care to the Rescue?
This essay solves the patient-consumer debate by
focusing not on the patient/consumer dichotomy
but on the attributes of which they are comprised.
These same experiential attributes also provide guidelines for maximizing the “goods” and minimizing the
“harms” within health care relationships and institutions. Whatever health care reforms policymakers
choose will presuppose reproductive commodification; in consumer-driven health care, the market
is the medium for reform as consumption propels
change, and other models alter market health care
exchanges by either displacing or facilitating market
transactions (e.g., mandating information provision,
constraining medical malpractice litigation, etc.).
Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find realistic
reform solutions that do not presuppose reproductive
commodification.
Individuals such as Regina Herzlinger, a foundational figure in the consumer-driven (or consumerdirected) health care (CDHC) movement, know exactly
what to do with these attributes: allow care-seekers as
consumers to “voice their feelings” and effect change.97
By itself, commodification is neutral and does not
set clear guidelines for structuring reforms. CDHC
emphasizes consumer control over health care rather
than service providers and “employers and insurers.”98
Premised on neoclassical economic “rational choice,”
CDHC assumes patients “will demand less care if they
are burdened with a greater responsibility for pay301
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ing the actual cost of that care,” now borne primarily
by insurance; here, care-seekers must allocate finite
(or scarce) resources between health care and other
goods.99 For Herzlinger, allowing health care “insiders” to guide reform is tantamount to ceding control
to a “self-referential intellectual cartel” that quashes
innovation out of self-interest.100
In CDHC, change is wrought by “an assertive,
demanding, knowledgeable group” that voices concerns to industry officials until they respond with
innovations.101 Herzlinger stresses that the system
should be organized not by inputs such as “hospitals,
doctors, nursing homes, drugs, technology — but by
consumer needs.”102 Yet, she contends, Medicare and
private insurers micromanage payment systems, while
top-down pricing and care professionals maintain the
status quo and retard innovation.103 A healthy consumer market must have information on consumer
satisfaction and care outcomes, even if the government must oversee its collection and dissemination.104
Deeming the health care industry “insular, self-referential, [and] self-protective,” Herzlinger questions the
idea of consumer illiteracy and posits that other thirdparty providers have embraced this stereotype out of
self-protection.105 Third-party intermediaries could
transmute available health care data into forms widely
comprehensible and accessible to consumers.106 But
CDHC is unlikely to be implemented, much less succeed, if physicians prioritize profits over patients or
discourage those who do.107
In CDHC models, therefore, commodification itself
paves the way for reform, and experiential qualities
could guide change if incorporated into quality measures and reported to consumers. Crucially, this presumes some mechanism of allowing consumers to
consistently weigh quality alongside cost and other
factors in decision-making; indeed, incentives for
evaluating and reporting on patient satisfaction and
other quality measures are included within the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Moreover, ample evidence suggests patients believe
that these experiential qualities are enormously
important. In qualitative interviews, ART care-seekers
ranked physician bedside manner as extremely important, and a frequent motivation for switching providers. In addition, the Kaiser Foundation’s “National
Survey on Americans as Health Consumers” reported
that 57% of respondents said that patient reviews of
a doctor’s communication skills would tell them “a
lot” about a doctor’s quality, ranking fourth below
measures such as malpractice suits filed, numbers
of procedures performed, and board certification.108
Moreover, 57% stated that patient reviews of how
well a health plan’s doctors communicated would tell
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them “a lot” about health plan quality.109 Incorporating experiential qualities into reform efforts may even
increase care-seekers’ acceptance of insurance coverage constraints such as limited provider networks that
include “high-quality” providers and exclude those of
“low quality or low efficiency.”110 Finally, care-seekers’
choices would “help us understand the sorts of tradeoffs individuals are willing to make.”111
We are currently witnessing these very legal and
cultural debates play out in the ACA contraception
mandate. The United States Supreme Court recently
ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that closely-held
for-profit corporations were exempt from the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate, as it violated
their freedoms of conscience and religion.112 Other
mandate opponents contended that taxpayers and
employers would be subsidizing their employees’ sexual activities, commodifying sexuality and denigrating
women’s dignity.113 Mandate supporters argued that it
protected women’s freedom to make health care decisions and that scrapping it would burden employees
that did not share their employer’s beliefs. Therefore,
the contraception mandate was a contest over how far
the health care market and consumer demand extend,
and who could set the terms along which contraceptives are commodified.
Consumer-Driven Health Care and ART and Abortion
Within ART and abortion, CDHC would have important repercussions. ART more closely approximates
a consumer-driven market than abortion, given low
insurance coverage and lack of state regulation, making innovation more likely. These days, innovations
in abortion amount to contests between novel state
restrictions and creative clinic responses. Moreover,
if assertive, demanding, and knowledgeable consumers drive market change, then change will favor
elite interests. Consumer-driven change would not
be democratic; instead, it would likely resemble an
inverse oligopoly, a market dominated by a handful of
buyers, not sellers. This is unproblematic so long as
elite and non-elite interests and interest prioritization
align, but these diverse populations likely value and
prioritize cost, convenience, and access differently.
Again, this is less of a problem in ART than in
abortion, since scarce insurance coverage for fertility
treatment produces a less-diverse, elite-dominated
consumer base;114 care-seekers who are poor, poor
advocates, or poorly informed can ride the coattails
of their elite counterparts. ART care-seekers also
have more reform opportunities; care relationships
within IVF are more extensive than in abortion, where
women make far fewer visits. Switching providers is a
realistic option for ART care-seekers,115 but dissatisjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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fied women in abortion have limited recourse, and can
only tell others about their experiences and perhaps
obtain future procedures elsewhere.
The abortion consumer base is much more
diverse;116 women may not know that they can effect
change or have the time or energy to think about it.
Due to procedure stigma, population vulnerability,
perceived urgency, and visit brevity, these women
have fewer reform incentives and opportunities. Thus,
reform pressure must come from professional associations or third parties — though states have been the

“shifting altogether to a market commodity.”120 Thus,
Cohen calls for caution when estimating whether state
programs (report cards or online databases listing
credentials and disciplinary/malpractice records) will
successfully increase consumer information access;
for Korobkin, CHDC demands “heroically implausible” decision-making ability of consumers facing complex, new and emotional choices.121 Others are even
less optimistic.122 According to the Kaiser Foundation,
one in ten Americans used such information in health
care decision-making (though few saw comparative

The goal of reform is not to provide care-seekers with the freedom to
commodify, but the freedom to negotiate commodification. The crucial
question will always be who has the power to control the meaning of a
commodity, and what respect is accorded alternative and contrasting meanings.
Any effective reform model will allow care-seekers to stratify along experiential
characteristics in diverse ways, while incentivizing helpful qualities.
heavyweights in that arena.117 Usually empowering
and equalizing, information can work against choice
when state-mandated “informed consent” regimens
dispense data linking abortion to future infertility,
breast cancer, and mental distress or illness.118 Here,
state regulations displace markets, carving out areas
where consumer preferences cannot control.
In ART and abortion, insured and uninsured individuals would likely make very different choices, along
the lines of elite versus non-elite needs and preferences. Insured individuals, freed from at least some
anxiety over treatment cost, could prioritize relational
quality (better care professional — seeker interaction) or greater comfort or convenience. While the
uninsured would likely prioritize cost, as private payers they may also enjoy expanded care options from
market innovation. Bundling comprehensive women’s health care together in one clinic, however, may
ensure that quality reforms are applied to both ART
and abortion.
But many doubt that CDHC is the answer to careseekers’ prayers. For Schneider and Hall, consumerism models are “doomed to disappoint” for several
reasons: care-seekers do not match the consumer ideal
and may evade choice, providers experience tension
between care and financial counseling, and consumer
models diminish our responsibility towards others
without health care.119 Moreover, combining “market discipline” and health care is a laudable goal, but
“introducing value into the system” is different from
abortion and art • summer 2015

information about health plans, hospitals or doctors),
and many that did so either did not need to make a
decision then or found the information irrelevant.123
Of course, other pathways to reform besides CDHC
are possible. Such strategies could be market-displacing, market-facilitating or market-channeling, and led
by the government and/or by industry actors.124 Atul
Gawande posits change is spurred by altering physicians’ orientation to each other and to the profession.
For example, big health care “chains” could “thrive
because they provide goods and services of greater
variety, better quality, and lower cost than would
otherwise be available,” since vast size provides buying power, centralization, and innovation.125 Basing
payment not only on service or process but outcome
and quality creates financial incentives for focusing
on clinical performance.126 Russell Korobkin proposes
that government use choice architecture to “facilitate
private choices,” helping individuals to make “personally utility-maximizing choices” through “relative value
health insurance” covering “medical interventions that
meet or exceed a given level of cost-effectiveness.”127
These models might be more paternalistic, but
paternalism, like commodification, has neutral
valence. In this volume, for instance, Swanson documents how Guttmacher shaped abortion and ART
laws in the mid-20th century to eliminate the “doctor’s dilemma,” where laws constrained medical treatment.128 Guttmacher advocated for free choice to give
doctors, not patients, greater freedoms in treatment
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decision making, but his efforts nevertheless benefited patients.129 Swanson finds a place for paternalism in medical decision-making because consumer
demand may entail “the surrender of professional
judgment.”130
Regardless of the reform model, ideally the goal will
be to create a care system that both is profitable and
gives care-seekers what they want. Our willingness to
tolerate unequal access to basic health care will likely
be a pivotal factor.131 Crucially, both ART and abortion
care could provide models for health care reform in
other practice areas. In both contexts, providers are
likely to give private payers cost information up front,
and interviews with providers suggest that dialogic
care models, creation of trust, and informed consent
conversations are high priorities.

Conclusion
The goal of reform is not to provide care-seekers with
the freedom to commodify, but the freedom to negotiate commodification. The crucial question will always
be who has the power to control the meaning of a commodity, and what respect is accorded alternative and
contrasting meanings. Any effective reform model will
allow care-seekers to stratify along experiential characteristics in diverse ways, while incentivizing helpful
qualities.
Change will not follow from labeling care-seekers
as patients or consumers, but from perceiving them as
embodied decision makers with unique and even contradictory characteristics, needs and desires. Whether
bottom-up or top-down, it is essential that reform
leave room for relationality, including therapeutic
relations where care-seekers exercise autonomy. Relational approaches have valuable precedent; in Roe v.
Wade, the abortion decision is ascribed to the woman
and her physician, and the ACA gives relationality
teeth by incorporating patient satisfaction measures
that include provider communication skills. Though
markets, like the state, are traditionally “impersonal
systems,” care-seekers are demanding something
more. Allocating attention to experiential characteristics in reform will help accommodating relationality in health care models, and should prioritize those
most in need, not most able to pay.
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